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JUDICIAL INSTRUCTIONS, DEFENDANT CULPABILITY, AND 
JURY INTERPRETATION OF LAW 
DARRYL K. BROWN* 
American courts give criminal juries a lot of authority on the decisions that 
are delegated to them.  Acquittals cannot be reviewed and convictions are 
reviewed very deferentially.1  So it is an important question which issues juries 
get, which decisions they make, and what guidance and resources they are 
given to make those decisions.  Trial judges must properly assign those issues 
to juries when they give jury instructions and they must convey those 
instructions in a way that enables the jury to fulfill their important, largely 
unreviewable, tasks competently. 
Judges have two distinct tasks in conveying law to juries in American 
courts.  First, they must discern which parts of the law are within the jury’s 
purview and thus must be conveyed to them in instructions.  This issue is 
partly a matter of constitutional law; the jury must decide all material issues in 
the charge.2  Partly this is a matter of statutory interpretation, especially 
whether the legislature intended a portion of the statute under which defendant 
is charged to be an element of the crime, and thus in jury’s purview, or a mere 
sentencing factor, in which case it is reserved for the judge.  And partly this 
issue is a matter of common law; for instance, judges may need to determine 
the applicability of a common law defense to a statutory crime.3  From these 
sources judges must determine which parts of statutes under which defendants 
are charged must be conveyed to juries through instructions. 
Once those decisions are made, judges must determine how to convey that 
law, meaning how to compose the instructions.  Sometimes they will simply 
read the statute to the jury; sometimes they will read versions of the law drawn 
 
* Associate Professor and Alumni Faculty Fellow, Washington & Lee University School of Law, 
Lexington, Virginia 24450 USA, e-mail: browndk@wlu.edu.  Prepared for presentation at ISISC 
Conference on “Lay Participation in the Criminal Trial in the 21st Century,” May 26-29, 1999, 
Siracusa, Italy. 
 1. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). 
 2. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511 (1995). 
 3. See United States v. DeZarn, 157 F.3d 1042, 1051 (6th Cir. 1998) (discussing “literal 
truth” defense to perjury). 
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from appellate opinions or model jury instructions.4  (In some cases, like 
DeZarn, a key defense may be clear from common law; judges must devise 
instructions for that law as well.)  Other times, judges perceive the need—and 
social science confirms the need—to paraphrase statutes and case law in ways 
more understandable to lay jurors.  Those judgments on re-phrasing 
instructions often have substantive implications. 
These judicial tasks and the doctrines courts have evolved to guide them 
are, I believe, linked to the jury’s normative role, which is to apply law in a 
way that assesses the culpability of a defendant and assesses his conduct 
normatively, and not merely positively.  The contemporary nature of criminal 
law creates a special set of problems for statutory application arising from the 
multiple functions that criminal rules serve.  Criminal statutes long have been 
understood as serving two distinct functions.5  First, criminal statutes announce 
“conduct rules” to the general public, giving them ex ante warning about the 
standards to which they must conform their behavior in order to avoid criminal 
punishment.6  Statutes tell us what conduct is prohibited or, occasionally, 
required.  Second, criminal statutes provide “decision rules” or principles for 
adjudicating individual cases of conduct-rule violations.7  Decision rules are 
directed at those who adjudicate cases rather than at the general public.  
Although scholars typically consider judges as the primary audience for these 
rules, and prosecutors when they make charging decisions as a secondary 
audience, criminal juries are also guided by these rules.  While conduct rules 
need to be clear and simple, so that all citizens can readily understand and 
follow them, decision rules often must be more subtle and complicated, in 
order to “take account of the complex and varied situational factors relevant to 
 
 4. See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 403 (1999) 
(describing trial judge reading relevant statute passages to the jury and then composing 
supplemental explanations of the statute’s meaning). 
 5. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in 
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 626 (1984) (citing JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON 
GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 430 
(Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1948)); Kent Greenawalt, A Vice of Its Virtues: The Perils of Precision in 
Criminal Codification, as Illustrated by Retreat, General Justification, and Dangerous 
Utterances, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 929 (1988); Paul H. Robinson, A Functional Analysis of Criminal 
Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (1994) [hereinafter Robinson, Functional Analysis]; Paul H. 
Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 729 (1990) 
[hereinafter Robinson, Rules of Conduct]. 
 6. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 5, at 626, 630. 
 7. See id.  “Principles of adjudication” is Robinson’s phrase.  See Robinson, Rules of 
Conduct, supra note 5, at 731.  Dan-Cohen uses “decision rule.”  See Dan-Cohen, supra note 5, at 
627. 
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an actor’s blameworthiness, as well as the capacities and characteristics of the 
particular actor.”8 
The distinction between conduct rules and decision rules is useful for 
understanding the normative nature of criminal law and thus the normative 
nature of the application of criminal statutes.  Criminal judgments carry a 
special condemnation of moral blameworthiness that violations of other rules 
(say, tort rules) do not.  Each criminal adjudication assesses not only whether a 
conduct-rule violation occurred, but also whether the violation is 
blameworthy.9  The terms of criminal statutes, then, are normative as well as 
positive; a guilty verdict is a moral, as well as descriptive, judgment.  Although 
a guilty verdict is at bottom a moral assessment of blameworthiness, the 
inquiry should not be an ad hoc one guided solely by the judge or jury’s moral 
intuitions.  Rather, decision rules guide the judgment; those rules strive, with 
only partial success, to insure a consistency of moral standards across cases 
and conduct rules.10  They also aim to limit the decisionmaker, who, after all, 
can dictate governmental control of a citizen’s liberty. 
A criminal verdict is inevitably an individualized assessment of the 
defendant’s character.  It evaluates his judgment in choosing a particular 
course of action in particular circumstances.  In doing so, the verdict serves 
criminal law’s expressive function of assessing the moral quality of his 
judgment, and thereby his character.11  Criminal law requires not simply that 
we obey rules, but that each person “pursue his chosen ends with a due regard 
for us—with a certain amount of maturity, disinterestedness, and 
 
 8. Robinson, Rules of Conduct, supra note 5, at 732. 
 9. See PETER BRETT, AN INQUIRY INTO CRIMINAL GUILT 40 (1963); GEORGE P. 
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 395-401, 532-38 (1978) (describing “persistent tensions 
in legal terminology . . . between the descriptive and normative uses of the same terms,” and 
recounting “a normative theory of guilt,” rather than a merely descriptive one, that emerged in the 
nineteenth century); SANFORD H. KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL 
LAW 65-106 (1987) (contrasting positivists’ focus on social dangerousness as the basis for 
criminal sanction with the dominant concern with blameworthiness and “moral innocence,” 
which explains mens rea requirements and excuses such as the insanity defense); Dan M. Kahan 
& Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 
301-46 (1996). 
 10. Cf. Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1465 (1995) 
(arguing that no juror exercising practical reason “proceeds every step of the way making highly 
particularized decisions—that would be impossible,” and that jurors “must generalize from past 
experience”). 
 11. See R.B. Brandt, A Motivational Theory of Excuses in the Criminal Law, in CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: NOMOS XXVII 165 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985) (arguing that 
“criminal liability requires a motivational fault” so that criminal law punishes only those whose 
“behavior is a result of some defect of standing motivation (one might say ‘character’ instead)”); 
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 436 (1958). 
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perspicacity.”12  We condemn wrongdoers not solely for violating rules but 
“also for exhibiting the kind of character failing associated with insufficient 
commitment to the moral norms embodied in the community’s criminal law.”13 
Judges’ construction of law in jury instructions plays an important role in 
whether and how jurors assess defendants’ culpability.  This normative 
judgment, recent scholarship has persuasively argued, is a nearly inextricable 
component of the statutory application task.14  It is also, I suggest, the 
functional goal behind the key traditional American rationale for the jury, 
which is to interpose a panel of citizens between the individual and the 
government as a check on government abuse of power.  Before the 
government—either in the form of a legislature that enacted oppressive, 
indefensible laws, or an executive official abusing prosecutorial authority—can 
deprive a citizen of liberty, a panel of citizens not only assesses whether the 
defendant violated the elements of the statute, but also whether his actions 
were blameworthy. 
If, as I suggest, juries make normative judgments about offender 
culpability when applying law and courts structure a variety of doctrines to 
ensure that jurors make such judgments, it is an important question whether 
juries’ apply law in a defensible, appropriate way.  What sort of applications of 
rules constitute a normatively appropriate construction of law—are questions 
that the study of statutory interpretation pursues.15  The second part of this 
paper, then, offers data from a small empirical examination of whether juries 
apply judicial instructions using interpretive methods that are familiar to 
judges (such as looking to plain textual meaning, statutory purpose or public 
values),16 and whether they pursue those interpretive tasks with the goal of 
applying law in a way that assesses defendant’s moral culpability. 
This paper will proceed in two parts.  The first Part will explore recent 
decisions, largely by the United States Supreme Court, that have clarified the 
parameters of jury authority, and thus what issues the jury gets to decide (and 
 
 12. Huigens, supra note 10, at 1424. 
 13. Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse - but Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 127, 130 (1997). 
 14. See, e.g., Huigens, supra note 10, at 1464-65; Dan-Cohen, supra note 5, at 630-31. 
 15. Easy rule-application decisions typically are so because all interpretive concerns—plain 
meaning, purpose, justice of the outcome—point the same way once facts are determined.  Cf. 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 
1018, 1065, 1082 (1989) (asserting that public values have less influence in statutory application 
decisions when the text being interpreted is clear and supported by other factors such as 
legislative history or statutory purpose). 
 16. Cf. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 164-66, 432-33 (1966) 
(offering a “liberation hypothesis,” based on extensive research of actual jury decisionmaking, 
that suggests that jurors allow values and norms to affect decisions primarily when the evidence 
in a case is weak or close). 
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on which it will receive instructions).  Together, these decisions identify three 
key sources of law that define jury authority, and thus to which judges must 
turn when transforming statutes and common law into jury instructions.  Those 
sources are constitutional law, statutory interpretation and common law.  
Interestingly, the cases also point out how an expansion of jury authority 
sometimes favors the state and at other times favors the defendant, though in 
each instance jury authority expands in a way that encompasses judgment of 
defendant’s culpability.  The final section of this Part will briefly look at one 
aspect of how judges convey law to juries—whether they simply read statutes 
to juries, paraphrase them, or provide juries with the statute plus an 
explanatory gloss—and whether that choice removes interpretive duties from 
the jury.  Part II will discuss a study involving a set of mock jury deliberations 
that suggest how, even in the simplest of criminal cases prosecuted under a 
simple statute, jurors infuse their application of law with normative 
considerations of the defendant’s culpability.  This study offers at least some 
clues as to whether juries make the sorts of normative judgments of culpability 
that appellate courts preserve for them and that criminal adjudication theory 
sets as their task. 
I. 
A. Initial Parameters of Authority: Jury Issues and Levels of Agreement 
Required for Verdicts 
1. Facts Decided by the Judge versus Facts Decided by the Jury 
The Supreme Court in Jones v. United States17 returned to an ambiguous 
and still-evolving body of doctrine that helps to set the parameters of jury 
authority, particularly with regard to assessing defendants’ culpability.  In 
Jones, defendant was convicted under a federal statute that punishes car-
jacking (i.e., theft of a car while the owner is still in control of the vehicle).  
The trial judge’s charge to the jury, however, included only the first paragraph 
of the statute, which states the elements of “tak[ing] a motor vehicle . . . by 
force and violence or by intimidation” while “possessing a firearm.”  The 
statute provides for an enhanced sentence, however, if serious injury or death 
occurs to a victim.18  The question posed in the case is whether the jury must 
determine the existence of those facts as well, though they related only to 
whether the sentence may be increased.  Relying largely on an analysis of 
legislative intent, the Court construed the statute to mean that the injury 
 
 17. 526 U.S. 227, 244-46, 248 (1999). 
 18. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. 1992). 
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questions were elements of the crime, which must be determined by the jury, 
rather than mere sentencing factors, which could be determined by a trial 
judge.  In reaching that conclusion, the Court reasoned that it wanted to avoid 
construing the statute in a way that raised doubts about its constitutionality, 
and it noted that the case law under the criminal jury trial right of the Sixth 
Amendment (as well as due process doctrine) “suggests” that legislatures and 
courts may not take from juries the determination of “any fact . . . that 
increases the maximum penalty for a crime.”19  While legislatures have full 
authority to define crimes, they cannot manipulate procedural safeguards such 
as jury fact-finding by labeling as a “sentencing factor” an essential fact that 
increases liability. 
Jones suggests, then, that facts that are important to the final determination 
of defendant’s level of culpability, at least with regard to his actions during the 
criminal conduct (as opposed to his prior criminal conduct), should be reserved 
for the jury.  One cannot read too much into Jones; the Court expressly noted 
its doctrine on this point is unresolved, and thus a legislature may be able to 
circumvent much of this restriction by more clearly drafting a statute to assign 
such issues to the judge as part of the sentencing decision.20  Judges retain the 
sole power (when granted by the legislature) to assess important facts beyond 
the immediate criminal conduct that affect sentencing, such as defendant’s 
history of criminal conduct and the extent of victim injury.  Nonetheless, Jones 
suggests an under-utilized way of viewing the law that governs what issues 
judges must cede to juries.  That division of authority can be seen not merely 
as mediating the state’s power over the defendant; it also serves the systemic 
value of ensuring jury decisions remain meaningful in a particular way.  
Preservation of such issues for the jury ensures that the jury adjudicates the 
important facts—and receives legal instructions upon the issues—most 
relevant to assessing defendant’s moral culpability. 
2. Incomplete Agreement on Required Facts and Theories 
Once the issues and facts reserved for the jury are identified, there arises a 
separate question as to the level of agreement jurors must reach with respect to 
a given element or fact.When the defendant is charged with murder, must all 
jurors agree that defendant committed the killing with a particular weapon, or 
that he intended to kill rather than merely killed by accident during the course 
of a robbery?  The U.S. Supreme Court has left wide leeway, as a matter of 
constitutional law, for juror disagreement on the particular facts or theories 
underlying a charge.21  Prosecutors have authority to charge a defendant on 
 
 19. Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 630-32 (1991). 
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alternate theories about what facts constituted the actus reus (e.g., whether 
defendant killed the victim by gunshot or by drowning) or the mens rea (e.g., 
whether by premeditation or felony murder).  Legislatures can enumerate 
different means by which prosecutor can prove elements and by which jury can 
find elements; juries need not agree on those alternative means.  In this sense 
both the legislature’s and the prosecutor’s power is expanded; the prosecutor 
can offer two or more theories at trial for proving the same element.  Jurors can 
disagree on which facts fulfill the element yet still render a guilty verdict.  The 
jury need not resolve those competing theories with the same level of 
agreement (say, super-majority if not unanimity) that they are required to reach 
on the basic elements, such as whether a homicide occurred.22 
Thus verdicts can be incompletely theorized, although only to a certain 
extent still undefined by constitutional law.  There are outer limits of due 
process, the Court suggests, on which act or mental state the jury must agree 
actually occurred.23 There is an obvious due process concern with vagueness—
that the defendant be able to identify what offense is prohibited by the statute 
and alleged in the indictment—and also with fairness, such that even 
sufficiently specified offenses (say, embezzlement and murder) cannot be 
alternate bases for liability.24  Judges use those doctrinal limits occasionally to 
narrow prosecutorial charges.  Beyond those basic limitations, however, the 
key responsibility is the jury’s, which gets a lot of leeway to determine how 
much unanimity on theories or facts that it wants to underlie its verdict. 
Apparently, it is common for juries to get no instruction on whether they 
are allowed to have disagreements underlying the verdict.  This is, then, a tilt 
toward one form of broad jury authority.  It leaves to the jury’s collective 
judgment and conscience how much agreement is necessary for conviction 
(assuming, questionably, they identify level of agreement as a topic they 
should consciously address).  In theory, this breadth of jury authority could 
work for either the defendant or the state.  The jury could decide, for example, 
that complete unanimity on theory and facts is required, despite the 
constitutional acceptability of incomplete agreement.  But over a range of 
cases, the doctrine favors the state.  It allows juries to convict without full 
agreement among jurors on underlying facts or theory, a breadth of authority 
that surely some juries exercise.  Yet, just as we see in the statutory 
 
 22. The Court’s recent decision in Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (1999), does 
not change the constitutional doctrine.  Richardson held that a jury must agree on the specific 
facts that constitute each “violation” in the “continuing series of violations” proscribed in 21 
U.S.C. § 848(a).  But that decision was reached as a matter of statutory interpretation rather than 
common law.  After Richardson, it appears Congress could amend the statute so as not to require 
that level of agreement, and its only boundary would be the broad parameters set by Schad. 
 23. Schad, 501 U.S. at 632. 
 24. Id. at 633. 
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interpretation issues examined below, this choice of jury authority—allowing 
jurors to determine what level of agreement they will reach to render a 
verdict—may well relate to jury assessments of culpability.  Jurors can 
determine what degree of consensus they must reach in order to render a 
verdict, perhaps requiring more agreement for the facts of some elements, for 
more serious charges, or when the choices between factual theories connote 
significantly different levels of blameworthiness.25 
B. Statutory Interpretation and Assessments of Culpability 
The construction of statutes is usually framed in terms of the tension 
between a reading that protects the defendant—exemplified by the rule of 
lenity, a statutory construction canon that commands ambiguities be construed 
in defendants’ favor—and a reading that expands the statute in favor of 
prosecutors, such as construing the statute to cover more varieties of conduct.26  
But another way to view those interpretive options is to assess whether the 
construction presents additional issues to the jury; in that sense, statutory 
interpretation expands or contracts jury authority.  With that consideration in 
mind, interpretations may be mediated not only by the fairness concerns that 
underlie the lenity rule, or by deference to decisions of the politically 
accountable branch of government, which underlies respect for legislative 
intent that explains some expansive readings favored by prosecutors.  It may 
also be mediated by whether a jury is competent to handle the issue.  
Competency, it turns out, has little to do with complexity, because we give 
juries incredibly complex statutes.  Instead, it seems to have more to do with 
(a) whether the issue is one that helps assess the ’defendant’s moral culpability, 
(b) whether the jury has access to resources that courts deem relevant to 
statutory construction, such as coherence with related statutes that sheds light 
on legislative intent.  The first concern may explain why some expansions of 
 
 25. States may choose to narrow the jury’s authority and require complete agreement on 
means of crime commission or other key facts.  Judges in particular may do so through their 
drafting of jury instructions.  Arizona’s Supreme Court, for one, encourages as a matter of policy 
(but does not require) separate verdict forms when an element can be proven by two different 
means.  (The trial court could, for example, give the jury one verdict form for premeditated 
murder and one for felony murder.)  Such mechanisms clarify jury’s reasoning for purposes of 
judicial sentencing and appellate review, although in some sense they constrain jury authority—
the authority to reach incompletely theorized agreements. Yet one still might see such approaches 
as relating to culpability.  If one distrusts juries to calibrate their level of agreement according to a 
fact’s relevance to culpability, then such judicial procedures force jurors to deliberate and to 
render a guilty verdict only after they have reached consensus on crucial issues. 
 26. For discussion of a recent, high-profile example, see Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing 
Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. 
L. REV. 1419 (1991) (discussing child-abuse statutes interpreted  to criminalize drug use during 
pregnancy). 
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jury authority seem to favor defendants, while others tend to favor the state.  
The latter, which I address in section C of this Part, through a discussion of 
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers,27 clarifies the division of statutory 
interpretation power between judge and jury. 
Consider United States v. Gaudin.28  Mr. Gaudin was charged, in effect, 
with perjury—more precisely, with making false statements on federal housing 
loan documents.  The statute under which he was charged forbade “wilfully 
falsif[ying] . . . a material fact, or mak[ing] any false . . . statements or 
representations. . . .”29  It was undisputed that defendant’s alleged “false . . . 
statements” must be “material” in order for him to be liable.  The trial judge, 
however, concluded that materiality was a legal question for the judge; he 
instructed the jury that they were to accept that defendant’s alleged statements 
were material.30  Defendant appealed his conviction, asserting that the 
constitutional doctrine requires that the jury be given the issue of materiality.  
The Supreme Court agreed and held that the issue of materiality is an element 
of the crime and thus must be decided by the jury. 
There is, admittedly, nothing inherently “pro-defendant” in reserving this 
decision for the jury.  It may be that judges would more frequently find false 
statements to be immaterial than jurors would.  But the ex ante assumption of 
most defendants, I suspect, matches that of Mr. Gaudin: they expect that their 
chances are better with a jury.  Regardless, the decision unequivocally 
reaffirms jury authority.  And the issue of materiality is an important one to 
incorporate into the jury’s general verdict of guilt or acquittal.  Materiality, 
after all, reveals whether the defendant’s statements were mere technical, 
blameless violations, or to the contrary, whether they were important enough 
 
 27. 526 U.S. 398 (1999). 
 28. 515 U.S. 506 (1995). 
 29. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509, recounted the statute in full: 
Section 1001 of Title 18 provides: 
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United 
States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or 
device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or 
representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to 
contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than 
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).  It is uncontested that conviction under this provision requires that the 
statements be “material” to the Government inquiry, and that “materiality” is an element of the 
offense that the Government must prove.  The parties also agree on the definition of 
“materiality”: The statement must have “a natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of 
influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.”  Kungys v. 
United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The question for our 
resolution is whether respondent was entitled to have this element of the crime determined by the 
jury. 
 30. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 508. 
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that they indicate his larger intent and even his motive and character.  
Materiality measures not only the effect of defendant’s actions in terms of 
social harm (whether the falsification likely led to improper loans) but also his 
culpability (in large part because extent of harm can be in an important 
component of culpability judgments).  To protect the culpability assessment 
implicit in guilty verdicts, juries need to consider the element of materiality.  
Gaudin, then, reaffirms the constitutional breadth of jury authority to the extent 
required to let the lay panel assess defendant’s full blameworthiness before it 
approves the government’s effort to punish him. 
The implications of Gaudin stand in some contrast to a recent federal court 
of appeals decision in United States v. DeZarn,31 in which the court of appeals 
upheld the perjury conviction of Mr. DeZarn, who made false statements under 
oath to a government investigator.  The court accepted DeZarn’s contention 
that his answers were literally true responses to literal understandings of the 
investigator’s questions.  But it found the questions were misstatements by the 
investigator and that both DeZarn and the questioner knew what the question 
was really intended to ask; to that actual topic at issue, DeZarn’s answers were 
misleading or false. 
The DeZarn decision is more a matter of statutory and common-law 
interpretation rather than constitutional law; the court had to define the reach 
of the perjury statute in this context, particularly in light of U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent holding that “literal truth” is a defense to at least some perjury 
prosecutions.  The DeZarn court read that defense doctrine narrowly, 
distinguishing the situation in which that doctrine arose—a defendant’s non-
responsive answer to a question—from DeZarn’s circumstance, which the 
court viewed as a clear, responsive answer that (though literally true) conveyed 
false information when the questions are examined in context. 
DeZarn, then, is an example of an expansion of jury authority that works to 
the defendant’s disadvantage.  Defendant wanted this case never to get to the 
jury.  Instead, the court permitted the case to go to the jury with a range of 
evidence on the context of the questions and answers at issue.  That evidence 
allowed the jury to view the defendant’s actions in fuller light and context—to 
assess his actual blameworthiness.  An alternate approach can be seen as 
limiting the jury to more narrow, factual tasks: what literal questions were 
asked and whether the literal answers were truthful.  Allowing the jury broader 
interpretive leeway of the event, by more broadly interpreting the statute to 
cover literally truthful answers in some contexts, allows a more accurate 
assessment of defendant’s culpability. 
This theme of ensuring that issues crucial to assessing blameworthiness get 
to the jury occurs elsewhere in recent Supreme Court cases.  In United States v. 
 
 31. 157 F.3d 1042 (6th Cir. 1998). 
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Cheek,32 the defendant did not file required income tax returns and was 
charged under federal statutes that provide that any person “who willfully 
attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax . . . or the payment thereof” 
is guilty of a felony, while “[a]ny person required [by law to file a tax return] 
who wilfully fails to . . . make such return” is guilty of a misdemeanor.33  His 
defense was that, as a result of his own research and participation in tax-
protester seminars, he sincerely believed that income tax statutes were 
unconstitutional and, therefore, he had no obligation to pay.  The Court noted 
that its prior decisions made clear that “wilfulness” in criminal tax statutes 
requires the government to prove the defendant knew of the duty and 
intentionally violated it.34  “Wilfulness” requires specific intent.  Yet the trial 
court had instructed the jury that Cheek must have “honestly and reasonably 
believed that he was not required to pay income taxes or file tax returns,” and 
that “[a]n honest but unreasonable belief is not a defense and does not negate 
wilfulness.”35  The Supreme Court held those jury instructions to be in error, 
reversed the conviction and sent the case back for retrial on an interpretation of 
the statute that allows even an unreasonable belief to constitute a defense if it 
is honestly held by the defendant. 
For the jury, the Cheek holding substantially changes the instructions it 
will receive and the terms on which it will determine the defendant’s liability.  
One could view the change as having little effect on the scope of jury 
authority; the issue is simply which of two rules the jury will use to assess 
evidence and determine guilt.  Yet if culpability is the organizing concern of 
jury authority (and criminal litigation generally), the Cheek holding expands 
jury authority in an important respect, and again signals that statutes should be 
construed so as to ensure issues relevant to culpability get to the jury.  Under 
the Cheek trial court’s approach, the judge rather than the jury would have 
made an important decision about culpability—that unreasonable beliefs can 
never negate liability, no matter how honestly and in good faith the defendant 
acted.  The Supreme Court’s reading of the statute, in contrast, requires the 
jury to assess both the honesty and sincerity of defendant’s beliefs and actions.  
It puts the jury’s judgment (and only the jury’s) squarely on issues that reveal 
moral blameworthiness—the defendant’s state and mind and personal 
intentions.  The jury can still assess the reasonableness of defendant’s actions, 
but does so now only as evidence from which to make inferences about the 
 
 32. 498 U.S. 192 (1991). 
 33. 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7203 (1954). 
 34. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 201. 
 35. Id. at 196-97.  To drive the point home, the trial court told the jury that “[a]dvice or 
research resulting in the conclusion that wages of a privately employed person are not income or 
that the tax laws are unconstitutional is not objectively reasonable and cannot serve as the basis 
for a good faith misunderstanding of the law defense.”  Id. at 197. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
36 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:25 
 
sincerity of his claims, rather than as a sine qua non for liability.  And in the 
Cheek case itself, there was clear evidence the jury considered its assessment 
of defendant’s subjective beliefs to be the crucial component of a judgment on 
liability: after returning a guilty verdict they felt was compelled by the judge’s 
instructions, the jurors took it upon themselves to jointly sign a written 
“complaint against the narrow and hard expression under the constraints of the 
law,” adding that at least some jurors believed that defendant’s beliefs were 
sincere although unreasonable.36 That response suggests the Court’s 
interpretation of the statute accords with what at least some lay jurors consider 
to be the central concern for assessing culpability in such cases. 
C. Levels of Statutory Interpretation: Allocation Between Judge and Jury 
Several aspects of the jury-instruction doctrine, then, expand or control the 
range of juries’ authority, including authority to interpret and apply law.  The 
recent case of United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers37 highlights a somewhat 
different issue: the decision shows the level of statutory interpretation that 
judges can effectively dictate to the jury.  The facts of Sun-Diamond and the 
statute under which defendant was prosecuted are not especially important.  
Defendant was a trade association charged with making illegal gifts to a 
government official with administrative authority over issues of concern to the 
defendant’s members.  The Supreme Court disapproved of the expansive gloss 
that the trial court gave to the illegal-gratuity statute, holding that a more 
narrow construction (more favorable to defendant) was the proper 
interpretation of the statute, consistent with legislative intent.38 
What is more interesting for our purposes is how the trial court instructed 
the jury on the applicable statute.  The trial court read to the jury the exact 
language of the statute under which defendant was charged, but it also 
explained the statute to the jury—it offered the jury the trial judge’s 
interpretation of the statutory language.  The Supreme Court disagreed with 
that interpretation and looked to Congress’s intent to determine the statute’s 
reach; it paid particular attention to “the context of the statutory scheme” 
meaning, to other, related statutes that describe and criminalize similar 
conduct,39 a strategy sometimes called “horizontal coherence.” 
In giving priority to that mode of analysis to determine legislative intent 
for a statute, the Court gives priority to a mode that the jury is unlikely to be 
able to engage in.  American courts typically do not give juries statutes that are 
not directly applicable to the defendant’s alleged conduct, merely as a resource 
 
 36. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 198 n.6. 
 37. 526 U.S. 398 (1990). 
 38. Id. at 405-06, 412. 
 39. Id. at 404, 408-09. 
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for interpreting the statute at issue.  Juries do have the ability to engage in 
another, primary means of determining legislative intent; they can try to 
determine the statute’s intent from its plain language and seeming purpose.  
But if “horizontal coherence”— i.e., consistency with other statutes—is a 
primary means of determining statutory meaning, juries are ill-equipped for 
that task.  Courts will take it upon themselves to provide an explanation of a 
statute’s meaning, which is to say (as in Sun-Diamond) an instruction that 
limits the statute’s meaning and coverage. 
Interestingly, while Sun-Diamond says, in effect, that if a court explains a 
statute’s meaning to a jury that it must get it right, there is apparently no 
constitutional or other requirement that trial courts explain statutes to juries.  
Trial judges could simply read the applicable statutory passages to the jury (as 
the trial judge did in Sun-Diamond) and leave it to the jury to interpret the 
law’s meaning and reach.  Because jury acquittals are not reviewed and 
convictions are reviewed deferentially when correctly instructed, juries could 
then come to wrong interpretations (as did the Sun-Diamond trial judge) 
without having that error corrected by review.  (In theory, of course, such 
errors will work only in the defendant’s favor.  Convictions based on wrong 
interpretations can be overturned, as Sun-Diamond illustrates.)  Trial courts 
have the discretion, then, through their drafting of instructions, to grant the jury 
greater or lesser interpretative leeway.  Alternatively, they can follow the 
example of the Sun-Diamond trial court—which is in fact the custom, I 
believe—and take for themselves an initial, substantial portion of the 
interpretive work. 
It is important to recognize that even when courts impose on juries a 
binding interpretation of a statute, the jury frequently still has significant 
interpretive leeway.  Again, the facts of Sun-Diamond provide an example.  
The defendant gave the Agricultural Secretary several thousand dollars worth 
of gifts at a time when the Secretary’s department had pending before it two 
issues of great interest to the defendant’s members (regulation of pesticide and 
changes in access to federal funds to market defendant’s goods overseas).  The 
statute prohibits giving “anything of value” to a public official “for or because 
of any official act performed or to be performed by such public official.”40  
The trial judge interpreted the statute in his jury instruction to mean that 
liability arises if defendant gave an “unauthorized compensation simply 
because [the official] held public office” and the gift need not be “linked to any 
specific or identifiable official act or any act at all.”41  The Supreme Court held 
instead that the statute requires the government to “prove a link between a 
thing of value conferred upon a public official and a specific ‘official act’ for 
 
 40. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) (1962). 
 41. Id. at 403. 
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or because of which it was given.”42  Even under such a statutory gloss, the 
jury still has the considerable task not only of determining the difficult factual 
question of the defendant’s intent, but also the meaning or content of such 
legal language as giving “for or because of” an official act.  The jury may 
arrive at a sense of defendant’s intent and still have difficulty whether that 
intent amounts to giving a gift “for or because of” a future act. 
In fact, even the most simple statutory language— or well-crafted judicial 
paraphrases of statutes—can leave significant interpretive issues for the jury.  
And those issues often implicate the defendant’s culpability; the jury can use 
judgments about culpability to inform its statutory construction.  The Sun-
Diamond jury, on re-trial, could conclude that the defendant’s intent is morally 
blameworthy and use that judgment to lead it to a construction of the statute 
and judicial instructions (“for or because of”) that inculpates the defendant.  
Part II of this paper recounts laboratory evidence that juries do exactly that—
use normative judgments about culpability to guide their conclusions about 
both factual issues such as mens rea and construction of relatively simple 
statutory language. 
II. 
A. A Note on Jury Comprehension of Statutes and Judicial Drafting of 
Instructions 
Social science research has demonstrated that jurors do not consistently 
apply jury instructions literally.  One explanation for these findings is that 
jurors simply do not understand the instructions.43  They may not remember 
rules or statutory elements they are given through instructions and they may 
misunderstand rules of which they have some memory, particularly if they 
have strong preconceptions about the alleged crime.44  The methodology used 
in some studies likely exaggerates the amount of miscomprehension.45  
 
 42. Id. at 414. 
 43. See AMIRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE 3-24 
(1982); Paul H. Robinson, Are Criminal Codes Irrelevant?, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 159, 170-75 
(1994); Lawrence J. Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to 
Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 153 (1982). 
 44. See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 168-72 (1983); Severance & Loftus, supra 
note 43, at 157-61, 194 (discussing studies); Vicki L. Smith, When Prior Knowledge and Law 
Collide: Helping Jurors Use the Law, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 507, 508-11 (1993). 
 45. Hastie has argued from substantial research that juries as a group likely understand 
instructions better than any single member does.  Hastie’s study of a large set of mock juries 
found jury memory averaged slightly over eighty percent for information from judge’s 
instructions, if one credits a jury with recall of information that any one juror remembers.  See 
HASTIE ET AL., supra note 44, at 81.  He also documented significant correction of jurors’ legal 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2002] JUDICIAL INSTRUCTIONS 39 
 
Moreover, juror miscomprehension is a problem partly separate from jury rule 
interpretation because much of the blame for jurors’ lack of understanding lies, 
to a significant extent, with courts rather than juries. 
Courts could substantially improve jury comprehension of instructions 
with two sorts of changes: rewriting them to reduce complexity and legal 
terminology and improving the manner in which instructions are presented.  
Traditionally, jurors receive instructions orally from the judge at the end of 
trial and often cannot take written notes.46  Studies indicate comprehension 
could substantially improve if jurors received written copies of instructions to 
take to the jury room, if they received key instructions at the start as well as the 
end of the trial, and if instructions were written in shorter sentences using 
fewer arcane terms.47  Further, there is evidence that jurors misunderstand 
instructions defining crimes because the definitions conflict with lay 
 
errors by other jurors during deliberations, a factor other studies did not explore.  See id. at 80-81 
(noting that individual jurors answered questions on instructions with less than thirty percent 
accuracy, but a “more meaningful examination of memory” found the jury’s collective memory 
of instructions was over eighty percent accurate); See also NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE 
JUSTICE: JURORS’ NOTIONS OF THE LAW 283 (1995) (discussing empirical studies “show[ing] 
that jurors do not ignore or willfully disregard instructions but that they remember and 
comprehend them.”).  Correction of jurors’ misunderstanding of instructions by other jurors 
repeatedly occurs in the set of eight Harris mock jury deliberations discussed below.  See, e.g., 
Transcript of Harris Jury No. 2, at 9-11 (on file with author), in which other jurors try to correct 
Juror 2’s incorrect understanding of the law. 
 46. See, e.g., ARTHUR D. AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION CONFRONTS THE JURY SYSTEM: A 
CASE STUDY 55-65 (1984) (discussing juror comprehension of instructions in a case that was 
tried to two juries because the first jury hung, with only the second jury receiving written copies 
of the instructions and pretrial, verbal instructions); See also JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 
91 (1994) (describing “judges’ furious, quick-paced, jargon-laced set of instructions” to juries). 
 47. See AUSTIN, supra note 46, at 60-65 (noting that the instructions in the case under study 
averaged 102 words per sentence, while modern American prose averages twenty-one words, and 
were written at a “sixteenth grade level” requiring graduate education to comprehend fully); 
ELWORK ET AL., supra note 43, at 3-24, 35-56; HASTIE ET AL., supra note 44, at 231; Raymond 
W. Buchanan et al., Legal Communication: An Investigation of Juror Comprehension of Pattern 
Instructions, 26 COMM. Q., 31, 32-35 (1978) (finding that jurors given pattern instructions show 
better comprehension of law than uninstructed subjects); Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, 
Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 
COLUM. L. REV. 1306, 1308 (1979) (finding improved comprehension when instructions are 
rewritten); Dorothy K. Kagehiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal vs. Quantified Definitions of 
Standards of Proof, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159 (1985) (finding that mock jurors’ decisions are 
affected by changes in burden-of-proof instructions); Vicki L. Smith, Impact of Pretrial 
Instructions on Jurors’ Information Processing and Decision Making, 76 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 
220 (1991) (finding that instructing jurors before as well as after trial improves juror 
comprehension); Smith, supra note 44, at 510, 533 (reviewing research literature and reporting 
results of an experiment with a revised instruction that “produced remarkable improvements” in 
mock jurors’ use of legal categories rather than lay conceptions of crime elements). 
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preconceptions of what acts and circumstances constitute those crimes.48  
Research indicates as well that properly crafted instructions can largely correct 
this tendency and improve jurors’ understanding of crime definitions.49 
B. Case Study: Mock Jury Application of Law and Assessment of Culpability 
I now turn to a set of mock jury experiments in order to illustrate the 
salience of two issues discussed above.  The first is the significant scope of 
legal interpretive tasks remaining for jurors even after they are given clear 
statements of relatively simple statutes; the other is the importance of moral 
culpability assessments in those interpretations and in final verdicts.  My 
findings suggest, I believe, that the court, in using culpability as an organizing 
principle of jury authority, structures jury authority around the central concern 
lay people want to focus on in rendering criminal judgments, and also is more 
likely to present jurors with the issues and concerns through which they want 
to mediate their interpretation of statutes. 
The experiments centered on a case file called Michigan v. Harris,50 which 
raises the traditional criminal law interpretive challenge of defining the reach 
of a state-of-mind requirement across several statutory elements.  In particular, 
the Harris mock juries repeatedly struggled with whether the statute’s intent 
requirement applied to circumstance as well as conduct elements of the crime. 
In Harris, fictional defendant William Harris is a retired machinist who 
took a pile of bricks from a vacant property on which they had been sitting for 
 
 48. See Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal 
Concepts, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 857 (1991).  As an example of such 
preconceptions, Smith’s research indicates that lay notions of kidnapping occasionally assume 
that the crime requires a ransom demand, that the motive must be money, or, in the case of child 
victims, that the motive arise from the context of a custody battle.  Id. at 861 tbl. 1. 
 49. See Smith, supra note 44, at 533 (finding that test instructions designed to correct 
erroneous preconceptions of crime definitions “produced remarkable improvements” and are “a 
promising way of improving decision accuracy”). 
 50. The case file was constructed, and this mock jury experiment conducted, by Professor 
Joseph Sanders and his colleagues at the University of Michigan.  Sanders had forty-eight mock 
juries, usually six members each, deliberate for about thirty minutes each.  Not all reached 
unanimous verdicts.  The variables tested were public ownership versus private ownership of the 
property; general-intent instructions versus specific-intent instructions; and an instruction 
commanding jurors to follow the law given by the judge versus one stating that the law was 
intended only to be helpful in reaching a just and proper verdict.  The experiment is further 
described in James A. Holstein, Jurors’ Interpretations and Jury Decision Making, 9 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 83, 86-89 (1985).  My data for this article consists of eight transcribed jury 
deliberations——one from each “cell” of the research design, that is, one deliberation under each 
of the variable conditions——as well as the paper by Sanders and Diane Colasanto that analyzed 
the verdicts of all forty-eight mock juries.  See Joseph Sanders & Diane Colasanto, The Use of 
Judicial Instructions in Jury Decision Making 7-10 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author). 
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the eight months since the property’s sole building had burned down.51  All 
remains of the burned building except the bricks had been removed.  The lot 
was fenced and had a “private property” sign but lacked a gate.52  The bricks 
were marred by burn scars and old mortar.  Harris stated at trial that he came to 
assume, during the eight months between when the building burned and when 
he took the bricks, that the bricks were abandoned.  So, one afternoon Harris 
loaded them into his truck, took them home, cleaned them, and built a 
barbecue with them.  He was seen loading the bricks by a woman who lived 
across the street from the vacant property and who knew him socially.  When 
the owner reported the bricks missing to the police, the police checked with the 
woman, and she identified Harris.  Harris admitted to the police, and at trial, 
that he took the bricks because he thought they were abandoned. 
The only real legal issue in Harris, then, was the defendant’s state of mind.  
Half the mock juries on the Harris case received a general-intent instruction, 
which stated in part that “the defendant’s intention is inferred from his 
voluntary commission of the act forbidden by law, and it is not necessary to 
establish that the defendant knew that his act was a violation of the law.”53  
The other half received a specific-intent instruction, which stated in part that 
“the crime charged in this case requires proof of specific intent . . . . To 
establish specific intent the government must prove that the defendant 
knowingly did an act which the law forbids, purposely intending to violate the 
law.”54  In addition, both juries were told: 
To sustain the charge of theft, the State must prove the following propositions: 
First: That Steven P. Connolly55 was the owner of the bricks in question; and 
Second: That the defendant knowingly obtained unauthorized control over the 
bricks; and 
Third: That the defendant intended to deprive Steven P. Connolly permanently 
of the use or benefit of the bricks.56 
 
 51. For the background facts of the Harris mock case, see Transcript of Michigan v. Harris: 
Trial Simulation 1-6 (on file with author). 
 52. Ownership of the property was actually one of the variables tested in this mock trial; half 
the juries were told an individual owned the lot and that it was posted “private property,” while 
the other half were told the state of Michigan owned it, and thus the sign read “property of the 
state of Michigan.”  See Sanders & Colasanto, supra note 50, at 8-9. 
 53. Id. at 9-10. 
 54. Id. at 10. 
 55. For the half of the juries told that property was publicly owned, the instructions 
substituted “the State of Michigan” for Connolly’s name.  See Transcript of Michigan v. Harris: 
Trial Simulation 12 (on file with author). 
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Thus structured, the Harris case poses a familiar issue of criminal law: the 
nature of a defendant’s intent and the nature of intent required for conviction.  
Must the defendant intend only the physical act—picking up bricks—or also 
the consequences—depriving the owner of their use?  Must he intend also the 
criminal nature of the act—that is, must he intend to commit a crime, or at 
least intend to do something he knows is wrong?  The differing instructions 
address this issue, but the language common to both raises it as well.  The 
Harris juries struggled with whether the requirement that “the defendant 
knowingly obtained unauthorized control” meant: (a) that he took the bricks—
which he happened not to have authority to do—to which his knowledge or 
mistaken belief was irrelevant, or (b) that he took the bricks knowing he was 
not authorized to do so.  They debated, in other words, a basic problem of 
criminal code construction: does the mens rea requirement extend only to the 
conduct element, or also to the circumstance element?57  This interpretive 
problem goes to the heart of defining culpability: Is one blameworthy under 
the former construction, or only under the latter?  For answers, jurors turned to 
a core set of norms and a broader set of interpretive strategies. 
The Harris fact pattern includes several elements addressed by jurors that 
point toward acquittal.  Some jurors find the defendant somewhat sympathetic: 
he has no criminal record, except for a reckless driving conviction.58  His 
alleged criminal act and its resulting harm were, in the view of some jurors, de 
minimus.59  Others viewed it as conduct better addressed by civil proceedings 
focused on restitution rather than criminal blame.60  In accord with Kalven and 
Zeisel’s findings about assessments of victim’s behavior, several juries raised 
the issue of whether the property owner was remiss in not putting a gate on the 
property, posting a sign on the bricks, or otherwise preventing the appearance 
of abandonment.61  Moreover, for many jurors, the defendant’s claim that he 
 
 56. Transcript of Michigan v. Harris Trial Simulation 12-13 (instructions given to mock 
juries) (on file with author); see, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 11 (on file with author); 
Transcript for Harris Jury No. 2, at 16 (on file with author). 
 57. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 7, at 8-10. 
 58. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 6, at 6, 10 (deciding that Harris was “not a 
criminal,” even to those convinced he committed this criminal act).  Other jurors had no 
sympathy for the defendant.  See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 4, at 26 (“I think the guy 
was trying to get away with something.”).  Like the Reed jurors, members of several of the Harris 
juries disapproved of allowing “sympathy” to affect their judgment and tried, consciously at least, 
not to allow sympathy or emotion to affect their, or fellow jurors’, judgments. 
 59. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 4, at 12-13. 
 60. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 8 (several jurors agreeing that the 
“equitable” outcome would be restitution or “return the bricks and it’s all over”). 
 61. See Transcript for Harris Jury No. 5, at 2, 10-11; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 7, at 4; 
Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 7; See also KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 16, at 242-57. 
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intended no crime and believed he was taking abandoned property made his 
intent insufficient for conviction.62 
None was sufficiently strong to overcome many jurors’ plain-language 
interpretations of the statute, particularly under the general-intent instruction.  
The plain-language approach here is strengthened by considerations that point 
toward conviction, leading many jurors to feel no need to explore 
interpretations of intent instructions that would support acquittal.63  The most 
important such factor, discussed by every jury and dominating discussion of 
some, was a common norm or value we can identify as a law-based public-
value—the private-property norm.64 
For many jurors, this theft case implicated the strong value they place on 
private ownership of property, including the right to exclude others and to do 
with property what one wishes—such as leaving items untended indefinitely.  
Many jurors expected the law to be applied so as to reinforce this fundamental 
property norm and to impose no ongoing obligations on owners, such as 
posting signs to forestall assumptions of abandonment.65  Jurors who held 
strongly to the private property norm occasionally voiced overt disagreement 
with the specific-intent requirement, which they saw as undercutting criminal 
convictions for those who take others’ property.66  On the other side, one juror 
who leaned strongly toward acquittal because she thought the defendant’s 
intent was insufficiently blameworthy also voiced disagreement with the law.67  
More often, jurors did not overtly voice such disagreement but did allow 
 
 62. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 6, at 5, 7; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 7, at 14. 
 63. Of the eight deliberations studied here, none of the juries unanimously acquitted the 
defendant.  Jury No. 1 hung 3-3, Jury No. 2 hung 4-2 for acquittal, Juries Nos. 3 & 6 voted 
unanimously for guilty, and the remainder hung with 4-1, 4-2, or 6-1 majorities voting for 
conviction.  See Harris transcript materials (on file with author) (verdict forms accompanying 
each transcript document file).  The high percentages of hung juries presumably arose from the 
thirty-minute time limit on deliberations. 
 64. Public values, as I use the term here, refer to widely held social norms that have some 
grounding in legal and political culture. See Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1007-08 (defining public 
values as “legal norms and principles that form fundamental underlying precepts for our polity - 
background norms that contribute to and result from the moral development of our political 
community . . . [those that] appeal to conceptions of justice and the common good, not to the 
desires of just one person or group”). 
 65. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 2, at 23; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 5, at 11 
(“It’s private, it belongs to somebody else.  You want to have to post . . . the whole front of your 
front lawn no trespassing, private property, . . . just to prevent somebody from walking off with 
something that’s . . . . . . in your front yard?”). 
 66. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 4, at 20 (“I wish they hadn’t put . . . in [the 
element requiring proof that the defendant intended to deprive the owner of property].”); id. at 28 
(“We’re going to have to edit that tape [which recorded the judge’s instructions on specific 
intent].”). 
 67. See Transcript for Harris Jury No. 3, at 5-6. 
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strongly held property norms to convince them of an application of the intent 
requirement that supported conviction.  This property norm was so strong and 
pervasive that for many jurors it was the explicit baseline of their legal 
reasoning.  Most juries had members who concluded that the defendant failed 
to perform an implicit obligation to check with the owner before taking the 
bricks,68 an expectation that arises from the property norm.  The norm also cut 
against the defendant’s asserted belief that the property was abandoned.  Jurors 
who strongly held to the norm tended either to find the defendant’s claimed 
belief incredible or, if honestly held, then unreasonable and worthy of little 
weight.69  The property norm in its strongest version—expressed by members 
of several juries—undercuts the very idea of abandonment, that is, that 
ownership can be relinquished by any means other than express gift or sale and 
that property can be unowned.70 
The property norm provides an important baseline for the Harris jurors’ 
understanding of the defendant’s intent.  For those starting with the assumption 
that all property is owned and can never be taken without first asking the 
owner, the defendant’s decision to take the bricks necessarily implied that he 
also intended to deprive the owner of the bricks.71  The strongest version of 
this approach, imbuing the property norm with clear moral content, inferred 
also that anyone taking property—and thus knowingly depriving its owner of 
it—knew also that he was committing a moral wrong, if not a crime.72 
 
 68. See Transcript for Harris Jury No. 2, at 6-8, 11; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 4, at 11; 
Transcript for Harris Jury No. 5, at 1-2, 4, 6, 11; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 4, 19, 20. 
 69. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 2, passim (Juror 2); Transcript for Harris Jury 
No. 5, at 9; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 6, at 2, 3, 10. 
 70. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 4, at 9, 21; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 5, at 2 
(“It’s got to belong to somebody.”); Transcript for Harris Jury No. 7, at 11 (“I personally 
think . . . property . . . does belong to somebody.” (first ellipsis in original)); id. at 20 (“But how 
can somebody abandon it when it’s on private property?”  “That’s what I don’t get either.  I don’t 
get that at all.”); Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 12, 17 (“Even ‘abandoned’ doesn’t mean that 
it’s not . . . doesn’t belong to someone.”  “All property is owned by somebody.” (ellipsis in 
original)). 
 71. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 7, at 13-14 (“I’m beginning to feel that quite 
possibly this guy did have the intent of . . . depriving this guy of his bricks . . . . [T]he intent is 
established because he never tried to find out if he could have them . . . . [A]nd he knew that the 
bricks were not his.”); Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 11-13. 
 72. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 2, passim (Juror 2); see also Transcript for 
Harris Jury No. 5, at 1 (“Now I’m sure he knows right from wrong . . . in the sense that . . . he 
knew there was a sign there saying private property, and private property is . . . just exactly what 
it says, belongs to somebody else and what’s on it, you know . . . belongs to somebody else . . .”); 
id. at 2 (“I’m sure that in the back of his mind that he knew that [the bricks] had to belong to 
someone . . . [y]ou just don’t do that.”); id. at 7; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 7, at 12-13 (Jurors 
5 & 6); id. at 16 (“[H]e knows that that’s wrong it says private property.”; “Sign that says private 
property . . . to me it’s not abandoned, it is private property.”); Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 
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With this baseline assumption about “common moral sense,” such jurors 
concluded that the defendant’s admission that he took the bricks met the 
statutory requirement that the “defendant knowingly obtained unauthorized 
control over the bricks.”  Jurors could reach this conclusion by either statutory 
or factual construction: either the mens rea element does not extend to the 
circumstance element of no-authorization because extending it allows more 
acquittals and so weakens property rights, or the defendant, knowing that he 
did not ask the owner’s permission, thereby knew that his taking was 
unauthorized.73  Thus, by deciding to take the bricks “the defendant intended to 
deprive [the owner] permanently of the use or benefit of the bricks.”74 
Mark Kelman argued several years ago that criminal law poses inevitable 
difficulties of interpretive construction, such that,”[l]egal argument can be 
made only after a fact pattern is characterized by interpretive constructs.”  One 
may view a defendant’s intent narrowly or broadly, or restrict consideration to 
a narrow or broad time frame.75  Kelman suggests that the ultimate fit of a 
factual and legal interpretation hinges in large part on the baseline normative 
vision that it serves.  Jurors construct such factual interpretations for a purpose, 
which is to assess culpability in light of criminal statutes.  Factual 
interpretation and statutory interpretation, then, likely have an interactive or 
reciprocal relationship: a factual story will make a particular application of a 
statute seem obvious, appropriate, or most plausible.  Conversely, statutory 
language that seems to compel one result in light of an initial factual 
understanding may prompt a jury to reconsider its construction of facts if that 
initial result is discomforting. 
It should not surprise us, then, that a decisionmaker would tend to be 
persuaded by a construction of an instruction that most readily serves her sense 
of the proper outcome.  Here, conviction and the underlying property norm are 
served by not extending the mens rea requirement to the circumstance element 
of authorization. Should that construction seem unpersuasive, the 
 
7 (“[I]t’s a terrible thing to think that the man’s property was taken in the first place, you know.”  
“That’s true, yes.”); id. at 20 (“[P]roperty does belong to somebody.  Now I could conceive of 
myself maybe going in there and saying, I could probably get away with a truckload of these 
bricks . . . .  But, by the same token, going in there, I would have to say in my own mind, I know 
that building must belong to somebody.”). 
 73. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 4. 
 74. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 4, at 28; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 5, at 13 
(“By taking [the bricks] he willfully deprived [the owner].”). 
 75. Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 
591, 593 (1981); see also, id. at 595, 620-27 (describing “interpretive constructs” such as broad 
versus narrow framing). 
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decisionmaker may reassess the factual interpretation to conclude that the 
defendant possessed intent with regard to the lack of authorization as well.76 
As part of the property-norm approach, some jurors referred to the fact that 
the defendant violated a separate law not at issue—the law of trespass.77  The 
trespass concern is a natural extension of the property norm, but we can also 
view the perceived relevance of defendant’s trespass as an effort by the jury at 
“horizontal coherence” within the collection of statutes that protect property.  
Legislation scholars note that courts sometimes turn to statutes related to the 
one they must apply—others in the same act or regulating similar matters—for 
help in construing the statute’s meaning and ensuring the compatibility of this 
application with the purposes of other statutes.78  Comparably, jurors 
concerned with trespass violations—and motivated by a strong property 
norm—wanted the theft statute in Harris broadly interpreted.  Failure to 
convict for this taking, they reasoned, implicitly permits trespass and weakens 
property owners’ right to exclude others from their land.  A coherent regime of 
statutes that enforce property rights will strictly forbid both trespasses and 
takings. 
A few jurors with strong property-rights views expressed no sympathetic 
understanding of Harris’s conduct; any trespass and taking seemed to them 
plainly wrong.  But more jurors voiced some sympathy.  Demonstrating the 
strength of the property norm, even jurors who found the defendant an amiable 
retiree, who was “not a criminal” and who intended no crime still thought he 
committed a “mistake of judgment” that merited conviction.79 
Interpretations based on a strong property norm conflicted with the 
familiar premise that moral blame requires the defendant to know and intend 
the full nature of his act with knowledge of all relevant circumstances.  This 
premise supports a mistake-of-fact defense, and it led a minority of the Harris 
jurors to vote for acquittal.  Most juries conscientiously analyzed 
instructions,80 often listening repeatedly to a recording of them.  They tried to 
 
 76. Eskridge has offered a gravity metaphor to describe the varying influence public values 
may have on statutory interpretation in relation to other considerations.  See Eskridge, supra note 
15, at 1018-19.  Thus, a public value to which an interpreter is strongly committed exerts a strong 
“gravitational pull” toward an interpretation that accords with it, particularly if the language is 
unclear.  See id.  Its pull will be weaker, however, if it conflicts with clear language.  See id. 
 77. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 1, at 18; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 4. 
 78. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 239 (1994) 
(tracing the horizontal-coherence concern back to the legal realists and noting that it strives for 
compatibility not only with current statutes but also with current norms).  See generally id. at 
239-74 (distinguishing and discussing horizontal and vertical coherence). 
 79. See Transcript for Harris Jury No. 6 passim. 
 80. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 1, at 22; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 3, at 4; 
Transcript for Harris Jury No. 4, at 6; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 5, at 14-19; Transcript for 
Harris Jury No. 7, at 10, 15; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 11-14. 
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determine whether the mens rea requirement extended to all elements, 
particularly the elements of knowledge of ownership and knowledge of the 
criminal nature of the act.  They assessed how the defendant’s belief that the 
property was abandoned fit within their legal analysis and reconciled this 
larger process with their conflicting sentiments about the wrongfulness of the 
taking and the basically benign nature of the defendant’s intent.81 
The property norm thus provided a moral framework within which to judge 
Harris’s culpability and, more specifically, the mistake-of-fact defense that his 
belief about abandonment raised.  The pervasiveness of references to the 
defendant’s duty-to-ask and to the unreasonableness of his assumption of 
abandonment provides a way to assess whether the defendant’s mistake was 
unreasonable and thereby his conduct culpable.  With the property norm as the 
baseline for their judgment, jurors found Harris’s mistake blameworthy. 
In this way, jurors confronted the enduring tension in criminal law between 
descriptive and normative uses of the same term.  On the mistake-of-fact issue, 
they opted for the latter.82  In giving moral content to the mistake, the Harris 
juries used statutory application to make the normative judgment at the heart of 
criminal adjudication; at best, their reasoning led to verdicts that were fairly 
explicit and plausible evaluations of Harris’s character while still working 
within the statutory language.  One can disagree with the construction by 
challenging the jury’s choice of norms, but the criminal law’s equation of 
liability with moral blame makes statutory interpretation a necessary means to 
judge culpability.83 
Still, a minority of jurors were particularly concerned that the defendant’s 
intent was insufficient for criminal liability.  For example, one juror repeatedly 
expressed the sentiment that “I feel he is innocent because he was not aware 
that what he was doing was a violation of the law.”84  But a larger number of 
 
 81. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 7, at 12-13 (finding that the defendant’s 
mistaken belief of abandonment negated the intent-to-deprive element).  From the deliberation, it 
is unclear whether Jury No. 7’s members do this primarily as a decision of statutory interpretation 
or more from normative reluctance to convict the defendant without such intent, though the 
premise of practical reasoning and dynamic interpretation is that those two are usually 
inseparably related. 
 82. The descriptive use, in contrast, would simply inquire whether the defendant in fact 
made the mistake that negated the intent or knowledge required to commit the crime defined in 
the statute.  See FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 395-401, 516-41 (1978) (tracing the shift from 
criminal law judgments as largely descriptive to “the centrality of normative guilt in the criminal 
process”). 
 83. See id. at 532-38. 
 84. Transcript for Harris Jury No. 3, at 13.  This juror’s sentiment is consistent with 
psychologists’ understanding of attribution theory.  See FRITZ HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS (1958); Edward E. Jones & Keith E. Davis, From Acts to 
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jurors clearly felt bound by a more inculpatory reading of the law, and they felt 
that they had a duty to apply it objectively, regardless of their personal 
disagreement with it or sympathy for the defendant.85  This is not to say, of 
course, that jurors who in good faith tried to apply the law neutrally in fact 
succeeded and were unaffected by norms or values. Judges, after all, are 
criticized for the same sorts of failures.86 
The recurrent theme among jurors is that the law is objective and 
constrains their discretion connects closely with recurring views about the 
proper role of juries.  Most of the Harris jurors felt the jury’s only duty was to 
resolve factual disputes and apply the law neutrally, with as little interpretation 
as possible.87  Juror 2’s approach is particularly interesting in light of the fact 
that his jury was given the quasi-nullification instruction that stated the law as 
merely “intended to be helpful to you in reaching a just and proper verdict.”  In 
the most pointed example of this sentiment, one juror perceptively argued that 
juries should simply apply the law as it exists and that revising the law should 
be left to the legislature.  In response to a juror who disagreed with the intent 
instructions and “resent[ed] having these qualifications placed on my 
judgment,” four of her colleagues argued: 
Juror 2: That’s an issue [to be settled] on a legislative basis rather than on 
juries and deliberations, and I still feel that you must work within the law . . . 
it’s entirely reasonable to change the law, but you must change it at the right 
place and at the right time, and not as it stands. 
Juror 5: . . . I agree that you have to stand with what the law says, regardless of 
how you personally feel. 
Juror 6: So you have to buy the judge’s [instructions], because he is 
theoretically interpreting the law. 
 
Disposition: The Attribution Process in Person Perception, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Leonard Berkowitz, ed., vol. 2, 1965). 
 85. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 3, at 15 (recording several jurors arguing that the 
law is and should be fixed and objective, that “there has to be something absolute you can count 
on,” and that “there has to be something where it’s either this or that”). 
 86. For criticisms of judges who claim to apply statutes by such purportedly neutral criteria 
as plain meaning, see, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1018-19. 
 87. See Transcript for Harris Jury No. 3, at 14 (recording two jurors describing the jury’s 
role as one of settling factual disputes and not to interpret or adjust the law).  Harris Jury No. 2 
had a similar discussion: 
Juror 6: [That is] a very rigid interpretation. 
Juror 2: But, that’s the only, that’s the only interpretation we can give it. 
Juror 4: Well, it’s the only interpretation you can give it. 
Juror 2: No, it’s the only interpretation.  It’s against the law! 
Transcript for Harris Jury No. 2, at 23. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2002] JUDICIAL INSTRUCTIONS 49 
 
Juror 4: Yes, because we can’t disagree with those instructions . . . .  [W]e 
have to go by the charges, but if the charges are wrong, it’s not [ours] to 
disagree with . . . 
Juror 2: I agree with what you’re saying completely.88 
The Harris juries also demonstrate the downsides of both the literalist 
approach to statutory application that many jurors initially favor and the role of 
public values in statutory interpretation.  The jurors who were most committed 
to quasi-mechanical law application also tended to voice least often thoughts 
indicative of consideration of an individualized, careful judgment of the 
defendant’s culpability.  “[W]e are charged with really only one thing,” one 
juror argued.  “We are charged with applying the law that was given to us, by 
the judge, to this case . . . Did [the prosecution] meet the requirements of the 
law?  If they did, the man’s guilty”89  For many—those who held strongly to 
the property norm and were given the general-intent instruction—the literalist 
approach coincided with their personal view of Harris’s culpability; that 
undoubtedly made them comfortable with the literalist, seemingly common-
sense, applications.  For others, especially those less guided toward conviction 
by the property norm or less toward acquittal by state-of-mind concerns, their 
view that they should apply the law with little regard for context or 
consequences reduced the effort required to pursue a moral judgment. 
For those who most adamantly endorsed the property norm, especially if 
given the specific-intent instruction under which the case for acquittal was 
strong, the force of this public value led some to interpret the law implausibly, 
verging on “nullifying” to achieve conviction.90  Public-values analysis, for 
 
 88. Transcript for Harris Jury No. 3, at 5-6 (fourth ellipsis in original); see id. at 11-12 
(“[W]hatever you want to do to effect a change [in the law] is entirely up to you, but it all 
depends on whether or not you believe that the laws should be changed . . . right here as we’re 
discussing them or whether or not you think they should be affected through the legislature.”). 
 89. Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 24. 
 90. The strongest example here is probably a member of Jury No. 2, which was given the 
specific-intent instruction and voted 4-2 for acquittal.  This juror was so committed to the 
property norm that he denied property could ever be abandoned, and thus that the defendant could 
ever honestly assume that it was. Note here how this background value affects the juror’s finding 
(or interpretation) of facts.  See Transcript for Harris Jury No. 2, at 8, 11-12, 17-18 (Juror 2).  
That norm led him to mistaken understandings of the specific- intent rule, such as, “‘knowingly’ 
simply means taking it . . . with the knowledge that he was taking it, that he wasn’t taking it by 
accident.”  Id. at 18.  He responded to jurors who offered correct understandings of the specific- 
intent law with remarks such as, “[D]id he intend to pay the state for the bricks?  . . .   He’s guilty 
of not being better informed [that the bricks weren’t abandoned].”  The pattern of responses 
revealed an unwillingness—seen in a few other jurors, see, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 7, 
at 18 (Juror 6)—to accept a mens rea rule that required intent as to circumstance and result 
elements, a rule that would be insufficiently protective of private property.  See Transcript for 
Harris Jury No. 2, at 17-18, 21-25 (Juror 2). 
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juries at least as much as for judges, can mean that the decisionmaker allows 
personal normative preferences to overcome stronger, more persuasive 
interpretations of statutes. 
CONCLUSION 
Two forces support the American jury’s continuing role of making 
normative as well as positive, factual judgments.  One is doctrinal 
developments from appellate courts that protect jury authority.  Courts, under 
the mechanisms of constitutional, statutory and common law, continue to 
construe criminal statutory issues in a way that reserves for juries important 
decisions about the defendant’s conduct beyond the facts of his actions.  The 
other force is the seeming tendency of lay jurors to turn to normative 
judgments as part of their common interpretive tasks when applying criminal 
law.  Interpretive tasks recur even when courts offer guidance on constructing 
statutes, and even when the statutes are relatively clear and simple.  One 
question that remains is whether courts give juries sufficient assistance in 
identifying and resolving interpretive problems and consciously weighing the 
normative judgments with which they inform their factual and legal decisions. 
 
